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Arave v. Creech: UTrER DISREGARD FOR THE "CLEAR AND
OBJECTIVE" STANDARD FOR DEATH SENTENCING
INTRODUCTION
Because a sentence of death is unique in terms of its severity and ir-
revocability,1 the Supreme Court of the United States will not tolerate cap-
ital sentencing systems that allow the death penalty to be "freakishly" and
"wantonly" imposed.2 To satisfy the demands of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments, many states enacted statutes defining the aggravat-
ing circumstances that determine whether a particular first-degree murder
warrants the imposition of the death penalty. The Court has repeatedly
held that a statutory aggravating circumstance must channel and limit the
discretion of the sentencer by providing "clear and objective" standards.
3
In Arave v. Creech,4 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
Idaho's aggravating circumstance, which authorized the imposition of the
death penalty if the defendant exhibited "utter disregard for human life."
5
The Court held that the Idaho Supreme Court provided a constitutionally
sufficient limiting construction of the "utter disregard" aggravating cir-
cumstance to refer to the "cold-blooded pitiless slayer."6 Arave marks an
unjustified expansion of the "clear and objective" standard to include stat-
utory aggravating circumstances that make subjective reference to a de-
fendant's state of mind.
This Comment analyzes the Court's decision that Idaho's limiting
construction adequately channels sentencing discretion as required by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Part I examines the historical devel-
opment of the "clear and objective" standard and the future implications
of the decision. Part II provides the procedural history and factual back-
ground of Arave v. Creech. Part III scrutinizes the Court's reliance on Wal-
ton v. Arizona7 as precedent for upholding Idaho's statutory aggravating
circumstance. It specifically discusses how the majority's inaccurate appli-
cation of Walton undermines the Court's prior decisions, which consist-
1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring); Jeanne A.
Burke, Casenote, Nebraska's "Exceptional Depravity" Language at Death's Door: Moore v. Clarke,
24 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1019, 1028 (1991); Richard A. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravat-
ing Circumstance in Capital Cases-The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REv. 941, 946 (1986).
For an illustration of the Supreme Court's acceptance of the "death is different" principle,
see Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens, J., Brennan, J., & Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 306 (1983) (Burger,
CJ., White,J, Rehnquist,J., and O'ConnorJ, dissenting); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
797 (1982); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980), rev'd, 485 So.2d 1203 (Ala. Ct. App.
1984); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
2. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
3. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 919 (1982).
4. 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993).
5. ld. at 1541 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 19-25 15(g)( 6 ) (1990)).
6. Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1541.
7. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
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ently held that an aggravating circumstance must make reference to facts
capable of objective determination. Finally, this Comment advocates the
elimination of subjective criteria from capital sentencing schemes and sug-
gests that the Supreme Court mandate that a limiting construction of a
facially invalid aggravating circumstance must make objective reference to
the suffering of the victim.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Eighth Amendment Principle of Guided Discretion
Capital punishment has undergone dramatic change since it was in-
herited by the United States from English law.8 At the time of indepen-
dence, most homicides and all murders were automatically punishable by
death. Beginning in the eighteenth century, the states created a two-de-
gree sentencing scheme for murder and restricted automatic imposition
of the death penalty to first-degree murderers. 9 From the middle of the
nineteenth century until the 1970s, state capital sentencing schemes per-
mitted unguided discretion by ajudge or jury in deciding whether a mur-
derer should live or die.
10
The turning point in the struggle against unguided discretion in capi-
tal sentencing came in 1972 in Furman v. Georgia"l In Furman, the United
States Supreme Court established that the arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion.12 The majority emphasized that a capital defendant deserves consti-
tutional guarantees that ensure that the death penalty is imposed in a
consistent and rational manner.13 According to Furman, a state capital
sentencing scheme must provide a "meaningful basis for distinguishing
8. For a history of the states' use of capital punishment before 1970, see WILLIsA J.
BowERs, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATi AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982 (1984); Stephen
Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1980); ArthurJ. Goldberg, The Death Penalty
and the Supreme Court, 15 ARiz. L. REv. 355 (1973).
9. BowsRs, supra note 8, at 7-9.
10. See id. at 15-18.
11. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
12. Id. at 239-40. For an in-depth discussion of the Furman decision, see Kenneth M.
Murchison, Toward a Perspective on the Death Penalty Cases, 27 EMORy LJ. 469, 480-91 (1978);
Note, Discretion and Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1690,
1692-99 (1974); Thomas P. Gilliss, Recent Developments, The Furman Case: What Life is Left in
the Death Penalty, 22 CATru. U. L. REv. 651 (1973).
13. All five justices who formed the majority wrote separate concurring opinions.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 240. Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that the death penalty was
excessive and unnecessary and was therefore constitutionally impermissible in all circum-
stances under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 305 (Brennan,J., concurring);
id. at 358-59 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and Marshall continued to main-
tain that because the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment, it should never be
imposed by the states. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 366 (1988). Justices Douglas,
Stewart, and White did not agree that the death penalty was a per se violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments, but held only that those amendments prohibited a sentence
of death from being imposed at the complete discretion of the sentencer. Furman, 408 U.S.




the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases
in which it is not."14 Furman mandated that on a matter so grave as the
determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, a state
cannot provide complete and unguided discretion to the sentencer. 15
In an attempt to meet the constitutional demands of Furman, state
legislatures passed two types of capital punishment statutes. The first type
of statute required that the death penalty be imposed on all defendants
convicted of first-degree murder.1 6 In Woodson v. North Carolina17 and Rob-
erts v. Louisiana,18 the Supreme Court struck down this type of statute,
holding that mandatory sentencing schemes failed to meet Furman's man-
date that standardless jury discretion be replaced by procedures that safe-
guard against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death
penalty.19
The second type of capital sentencing scheme enacted by the states
required separate guilt and sentencing proceedings, consideration of ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances,2 0 and appellate review of each
death sentence.2 1 An aggravating circumstance is "simply a factor that the
sentencer must find before the death penalty can be imposed; it is the sine
qua non of capital punishment, the essential element of a capital sentenc-
ing trial."2 2 A mitigating circumstance is a factor that is relevant to show
that a defendant should be spared a death sentence. 23 Under this type of
sentencing scheme, once a defendant is found guilty of a capital offense,
the aggravating circumstances are balanced against the mitigating circum-
stances to determine whether to impose a capital sentence. After Furman,
14. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153, 189 (discuss-
ing the Furman decision). Justice White stated that Georgia's existing capital sentencing pro-
cedures offered "no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not." Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West
1974).
17. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
18. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
19. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302-03; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 334-35. The Court in each case
found that mandatory death sentences, instead of rationalizing the sentencing procedure,
may exacerbate unbridled jury discretion because in practice juries can avoid a mandatory
death penalty sentence by convicting for a lesser crime. Rosen, supra note 1, at 947-48 n.36.
20. Rosen, supra note 1, at 948-49. These post-Furman statutes were patterned after the
Model Penal Code Section 210.6, which provides that after a defendant has been found guilty
of murder, the judge or jury in a separate hearing determines the existence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances and decides whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh
any mitigating factors so as tojustify the imposition of the death penalty. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.6 (1980).
21. Rosen, supra note 1, at 948, and Burke, supra note 1, at 1029. For a complete list of
statutory enactments after Furman, see Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death
Penalty Statutes, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1690, 1699-712 (1974).
22. Rosen, supra note 1, at 952.
23. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978), the Court held that in a capital case,
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer have a full opportunity
to consider any relevant mitigating circumstances. The Court reaffirmed this decision in
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985).
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twenty-nine states adopted capital sentencing schemes that included statu-
tory aggravating circumstances.
24
L Since Furman, the Supreme Court has focused on states' capital sen-
tencing schemes rather than on the per se constitutionality of capital pun-
ishment.2 5 The Court has required that each statutory aggravating
circumstance satisfy the constitutional standards under Furman: channel-
ing the sentencer's discretion by "clear and objective standards" 26 that
provide "specific and detailed guidance"2 7 and that "make rationally re-
viewable the process for imposing a sentence of death."2 8 In Zant v. Ste-
phens,29 the Court held that a statutory aggravating circumstance "must
genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and
must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." 30 In addition, the
Court has held that a sentence of death may not be imposed without a
finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance.
3'
B. Supreme Court Cases Scrutinizing Aggravating Circumstances
Beginning with Gregg v. Georgia,3 2 statutory aggravating circumstances
have been continually challenged as being so broad and vague that they
allowed the sentencer unguided discretion in violation of Furman.3 3 In
Gregg, the defendant was convicted of armed robbery and murder after he
killed and robbed two men who had picked him up while hitchhiking.
3 4
The Supreme Court scrutinized Georgia's aggravating circumstance,
which allowed death to be imposed if the murder was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of
mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim."35 The petitioner asserted
that the alleged overbreadth of that provision rendered the entire Georgia
statutory sentencing procedure unconstitutional.3 6 The Court upheld the
24. Special Project, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairness and
Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 1129, 1220-21 (1984).
25. Rosen, supra note 1, at 946; see Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 960 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (noting that "[a] constant theme of our cases from Gregg and Proffitt through
Godfrey, Eddings, and most recently Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), has been emphasis
on procedural protections that are intended to ensure that the death penalty will be imposed
in a consistent, rational manner.").
26. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976).
27. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976).
28. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (Florida's capital sentencing
procedures meet constitutional requirements by specific and detailed standards); Proffitt v.
Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1263 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983) (any
decision to impose the death penalty must be based on clear, detailed, and objective stan-
dards; statutes allowing arbitrary and wanton jury discretion must be replaced by objective
standards that guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable a sentence of death).
29. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
30. Id. at 877.
31. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07.
32. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
33. See Burke, supra note 1, at 1031;'Rosen, supra note 1, at 960; and infra notes 22-51
and accompanying text.
34. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 158-59.




statute, acknowledging that although it is "arguable that any murder in-
volves depravity of mind or an aggravated battery ... there is no reason to
assume that the Supreme Court of Georgia will adopt such an, open-ended
construction."
37
In reaching this conclusion, the Court focused on the Georgia
Supreme Court's past application and construction of this aggravating cir-
cumstance in capital murder cases. Based on the fact that the Georgia
Supreme Court had approved an "outrageously vile" finding in only one
case involving a "horrifying torture-murder,"3 8 the Court held that Geor-
gia's statutory aggravating circumstance suitably directed and limited sen-
tencing discretion, thus minimizing the risk of the arbitrary and capricious
infliction of the death penalty.
39
In Proffitt v. Florida,40 the Court upheld the constitutionality of Flor-
ida's aggravating circumstance that authorized a death sentence if the cap-
ital felony was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."4 1 While conceding
that "all killings are atrocious," 42 the Court concluded that because the
Florida Supreme Court had limited this aggravating circumstance to a
"conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the
victim," 43 an adequate objective standard existed to guide Florida's sen-
tencing authorities.4 4 Gregg and Proffitt identified that although the lan-
guage of an aggravating circumstance is vague and overbroad and thus
facially invalid, a state court may save the aggravating circumstance from
constitutional infirmity by applying a narrowing construction that provides
clear and objective standards to determine whether a death sentence
should be imposed.
In 1980, the Court in Godfrey v. Georgia4 5 warned that a state not only
must adopt a constitutionally narrow construction of a facially vague aggra-
vating circumstance, but also must consistently apply that construction to
the facts of each particular case. In Godfrey, the Court once again reviewed
Georgia's "outrageously or wantonly vile" aggravating circumstance to de-
termine whether, since Gregg, the Georgia Supreme Court had continued
to apply this circumstance to a limited class of defendants. 46 The Court
held that the Georgia Supreme Court had adopted a constitutionally per-
missible construction of the vague circumstance by requiring a finding of
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing McCorquodale v. State, 211 S.E.2d 577 (1974)).
39. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206.
40. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
41. Id. at 255 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (5) (h) (West 1985)). The "especially
heinous" aggravating circumstance has been continually challenged as vague and overbroad.
For a complete discussion of the controversy generated by this aggravating circumstance, see
Rosen, supra note 1.
42. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255 (quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975)).
43. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255 (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973)); Alford v.
State, 307 So.2d 433, 445 (Fla. 1975).
44. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255-56.
45. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
46. Id. at 430 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (7) (1973)).
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torture or aggravated battery to the victim before death.4 7 Finding that
the Georgia Supreme Court had failed to apply its limiting construction to
he facts of the petitioner's case, the Court reversed Godfrey's death sen-
tence.48 Based on the evidence, the Court held that Godfrey neither tor-
tured nor committed an aggravated battery on his victims, who died
instantaneously. 4 9 In holding Georgia's application of the aggravating cir-
cumstance unconstitutional, the Court stated,
[T] he Georgia Supreme Court has affirmed a sentence of death
based upon no more than a finding that the offense was "outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman." There is noth-
ing in these few words, standing alone, that implies any inherent
restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death
sentence. A person of ordinary sensibility could fairly character-
ize almost every murder as "outrageously or wantonly vile, horri-
ble and inhuman."
50
The Godfrey Court plainly rejected the state's contention that a particular
set of facts surrounding a murder, however shocking, were enough, with-
out the application of a narrowing principle, to justify the imposition of a
capital sentence.
51
In Maynard v. Cartwright,52 the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which invali-
dated Oklahoma's "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating cir-
cumstance as impermissibly vague. 53 The Supreme Court held that the
words "heinous," "atrocious," and "cruel," standing alone, failed to provide
the sentencer with a clear and objective standard for imposing the death
penalty. 54 In the Court's view, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had not ap-
plied a constitutional narrowing construction to the facially vague aggra-
vating circumstance. 55 Rather, the Oklahoma Court simply evaluated all
of the circumstances of the crime to determine whether the facts plainly
constituted an "especially, heinous, atrocious or cruel" murder.56 The
Oklahoma court had considered the attitude of the killer, the manner of
the killing, and the suffering of the victim to be relevant and sufficient to
support an "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" finding, but had "re-
47. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 430-31 (citing Blake v. State, 236 S.E.2d 637, 643 (Ga. 1977);
Harris v. State, 230 S.E.2d 1, 11 (Ga. 1976)).
48. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 432-33. The Court concluded there was "no principled way to
distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which
it was not." Id. at 433.
49. Id. at 432-33. In the trial court, the prosecutor admitted several times-and the trial
judge wrote in his sentencing report- that Godfrey's crimes did not involve torture. Id. at
432.
50. Id. at 428-29.
51. Id.
52. 486 U.S. 356 (1988). For a thorough analysis of this decision, see Terrill Pollman,
Note, Maynard v. Cartwright: Channeling Arizona's Use of the Heinous, Cruel, or Depraved Aggra-
vating Circumstances To Impose the Death Penalty, 32 Asuz. L. REv. 193 (1990).
53. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 359 (quoting OKiA. STAT. As. tit. 21 § 701.12(4) (1981)).
54. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 359-60.




fused to hold that any one of those factors must be present for a murder to
satisfy this aggravating circumstance."
5 7
The Court also rejected the state's argument that the addition of the
word "especially" to the term "heinous" objectively guided jury discre-
tion.58 The majority reasoned that "[t]o say that something is 'especially
heinous' merely suggests that the individual jurors should determine that
the murder is more than just 'heinous,' whatever that means, and an ordi-
nary person could honestly believe that every unjustified, intentional tak-
ing of human life is 'especially heinous.' 59 In holding that the Oklahoma
court's subjective approach failed to meet the constitutional strictures of
Furman, the Court reiterated the principle that a narrowing construction
must require proof of some fact capable of objective determination. The
Court also noted that torture or serious physical abuse to the victim would
be a constitutionally valid limitation.6°
The Court in Maynard did not hold that a limiting construction re-
quiring torture or serious physical abuse to the victim was the only consti-
tutionally permissible construction of a facially vague aggravating
circumstance. 61 However, prior to the Court's decision in Walton v. Ari-
zona,62 the only construction the Court consistently approved as "clear and
objective" had been one that identified a form of serious physical or
mental abuse sustained by the victim. 63 Walton marks the first instance in
which the Court noted that it would uphold a limiting construction that
makes reference to the defendant's state of mind.
C. Walton v. Arizona
The petitioner Jeffrey Walton and his co-defendants robbed Thomas
Powell at gunpoint and forced him into his car, which they drove out into
the desert.64 The victim was taken out of the car and forced to lie face
down on the ground while Walton and his co-defendants decided what to
do with him.65 Walton then marched Powell into the desert, forced Pow-
ell to lie down on the ground, placed a foot on Powell's neck, and shot
Powell once in the head. 66 Walton later told his co-defendants that he
"had never seen a man pee in his pants before."67 Although Walton in-
tended to kill Powell immediately with the gunshot, a medical examiner
determined that Powell had been blinded and rendered unconscious but
57. Id.
58. Id. at 364.
59. Id. (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980)).
60. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 365.
61. Id.
62. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
63. See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 432 (see supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text); Proffitt,
428 U.S. at 255-56 (see supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 201 (see
supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text); Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363 (see supra notes 51-60
and accompanying text).
64. State v. Walton, 769 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Ariz. 1989), affd, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1033.
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had not been killed instantly.68 Instead, after regaining consciousness and
floundering around in the desert, Powell ultimately died from dehydra-
tion, starvation, and pneumonia.
69
The Arizona trial court convicted Walton of first-degree murder.70 At
the sentencing hearing, the judge sentenced Walton to death based on a
finding of two statutory aggravating circumstances, including that the mur-
der. was committed in an "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner
.... -71 The Arizona Supreme Court rejected Walton's challenge to the
constitutionality of the "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating
circumstance and affirmed. 72 The court held that it had previously deter-
mined that a murder is committed in an "especially cruel" manner when
the perpetrator inflicts mental anguish or physical abuse before the vic-
tim's death and that mental anguish includes a victim's uncertainty as to
his ultimate fate.73 The court concluded that Powell suffered great mental
anguish both during the car ride, when he was uncertain of his fate, and in
his final march into the desert, when he knew he was going to be killed.7 4
The court also defined the "especially depraved" prong to refer to a mur-
der in which the perpetrator "relishes the murder, evidencing debasement
or perversion." 75 The court noted that Walton's statement that "he had
never seen a man pee in his pants before" demonstrated a callous fascina-
tion with the murder and supported an "especially depraved" finding. 76
In Walton v. Arizona 77 the Court addressed whether the Arizona
Supreme Court had adopted a constitutionally permissible construction of
the "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" 78 aggravating circumstance.
The Court first identified the process by which a federal court properly
reviews the constitutionality of an aggravating circumstance:
[The federal court] must first determine whether the statutory
language defining the circumstance is itself too vague to provide
any guidance to the sentencer. If so, then the federal court must
attempt to determine whether the state courts have further de-
fined the vague terms, and, if ... so, whether those definitions
68. Id at 1022.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. IM. at 1032
72. Id. at 1038.
73. Id. at 1032-33.
74. Id. The court rejected the State's argument that the six days that Powell suffered
after being shot constituted "cruelty" within the meaning of the statute. The court noted that
in prior cases, it had limited the "especially cruel" prong of the aggravating circumstance to
situations in which the suffering of the victim was intended by or foreseeable by the defend-
ant. Based on the fact that Walton had placed the gun to Powell's head and pulled the
trigger, the court concluded that Walton intended to kill the victim immediately. Thus, be-
cause Walton could not have reasonably foreseen Powell's survival or longevity, the court
refused to sustain a finding of "cruelty." Id. at 1033.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
78. Id. at 654.
[Vol. 71:2
ARAVE v. CREECH
are constitutionally sufficient, i.e., whether they provide some gui-
dance to the sentencer.
79
In a 5-4 decision upholding the constitutionality of the aggravatink
circumstance,80 the Court held that the Arizona court's limiting construc-
tion adequately guided sentencing discretion, even though "the proper
degree of definition of an aggravating factor.., is not susceptible of math-
ematical precision .... ,81 Specifically, the Court found that the definition
given to the "especially cruel" provision by the Arizona Supreme Court
provided meaningful guidance to the sentencer. The majority also de-
clared, " [n]or can we fault the [Arizona] court's statement that a crime is
committed in an especially 'depraved' manner when the perpetrator 'rel-
ishes the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion,' or 'shows an in-
difference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a sense of pleasure'
in the killing."
8 2
In opposition, Justice Blackmun noted that the plurality's approval of
Arizona's limiting construction, which allowed a sentencer to impose the
death penalty based on a finding that the defendant "relished or derived
pleasure from crime," marked an expansion of the Court's constitutionally
permissible standard.8 3 He stated, "prior to today [the court's decision in
Walton], we have never suggested that the aggravating factor can permissi-
bly be construed in a manner that does not make reference to the suffer-
ing of the victim."8 4 Blackmun added that the Arizona Supreme Court's
inconsistent application of the "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" cir-
cumstance reflected the failure of this limiting definition to provide a
"clear and objective" standard to prevent the arbitrary and capricious in-
fliction of the death penalty.
8 5
After Walton, the bounds of constitutionally permissible aggravating
circumstances were less than clear. Walton marked the first time that the
Court noted that it would uphold an aggravating circumstance that made
subjective reference to a defendant's state of mind. To resolve the issue of
whether Walton redefined the "clear and objective" constitutional standard
to include subjective sentencing criteria, the Supreme Court granted certi-
orari in the present case, Arave v. Creech.8 6
79. Id.
80. Id. at 655-56. In Lewis v.Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990), rev'd, 974 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir.
1992), decided the same day as Walton, the Court by a 5-4 majority denied a similar challenge
to Arizona's "especially cruel, heinous or depraved aggravating circumstance." The Court
held that "W]e resolved any doubts about the matter in Walton." Lewis, 497 U.S. at 791.
81. Walton, 497 U.S. at 655.
82. ld.
83. Lewis, 497 U.S. at 793-94 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (discussing the Walton decision).
84. Id. at 794.
85. Walton, 497 U.S. at 693-701 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
86. 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993).
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II. ARA v- v C.EEc
A. Idaho's Statutory Capital Punishment Scheme
In Idaho, once a defendant has been found guilty of first-degree mur-
der, the court must conduct a sentencing hearing to determine whether a
death sentence will be imposed.8 7 The Idaho Legislature enacted a stat-
ute defining ten aggravating circumstances to be used by the sentencing
judge to determine whether a particular first-degree murderer warranted
the imposition of the death penalty.88 The complete statute is set forth
below.89 To impose the death penalty, a sentencing judge must find that
aggravating circumstance(s) are present and that the aggravating circum-
stance(s) outweigh any mitigating circumstance(s) that exist.90
The Idaho statutory aggravating circumstance at issue in Arave v.
Creech allowed for a death sentence to be imposed if the defendant exhib-
ited "utter disregard for human life."9 1 In State v. Osborn,92 the Idaho
Supreme Court admitted that the phrase "utter disregard for human life"
failed to provide a clear and objective constitutional standard to guide
sentencing discretion. The court explicitly recognized that a limiting con-
struction needed to be placed on this aggravating circumstance. The
court concluded that the phrase "utter disregard for human life" was "re-
flective of acts or circumstances surrounding the crime which exhibit the
highest, the utmost callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded
pitiless slayer."
93
87. IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(d) (1990).
88. Id at § 19-2515(g)(1)-(10).
89. IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(g)(1)-(10), states:
The following are statutory aggravating circumstances, at least one (1) of which
must be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt before a sentence of death can
be imposed:
(1) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder.
(2) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed another
murder.
(3) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(4) The murder was committed for remuneration or the promise of remuneration
or the defendant employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the
promise of remuneration.
(5) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting excep-
tional depravity.
(6) By the murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant
exhibited utter disregard for human life.
(7) The murder was one defined as murder of the first degree by section 18-4003,
Idaho Code, subsections (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f), and it was accompanied with the
specific intent to cause the death of a human being.
(8) The defendant by prior conduct or conduct in the commission of the murder
at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will probably consti-
tute a continuing threat to society.
(9) The murder was committed against a former or present peace officer, execu-
tive officer, officer of the court, judicial officer or prosecuting attorney because of
the exercise of official duty.
(10) The murder was committed against a witness or potential witness in a criminal
or civil legal proceeding because of such proceeding.
90. Id. at § 19-2515(e).
91. Id at § 19-2515(g) (6).
92. 631 P.2d 187 (Idaho 1981).
93. Id at 200-01.
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B. Facts and Procedural Histoy
Thomas Creech, the petitioner, and Dale Jensen, the victim, were in-
mates at Idaho State Correction Institution. 94 Prior to the offense in ques-
tion, Creech and Jensen engaged in an argument and "were not on good
terms."95 Jensen swung a weapon at Creech that consisted of a sock con-
taining batteries. 96 Creech took the weapon away from Jensen, but min-
utes later Jensen attacked Creech with a toothbrush to which had been
taped a razor blade. 97 Creech struckJensen several times with the battery-
laden sock, renderingJensen helpless.98 Creech then began kickingJen-
sen in the head and throat.99 Jensen collapsed and died later that day.' 00
Creech pleaded guilty to first-degree murder.1 0 ' At the sentencing
hearing, the state trial court found in mitigation that "Creech did not insti-
gate the fight with the victim Uensen], but the victim, without provocation,
attacked him. [Creech] was initially justified in protecting himself."'
0 2
However, the court determined that Creech's actions went "well beyond
self-defense"1 03 and evidenced an "excessive violent rage."
10 4
The trial court found five statutory aggravating circumstances, includ-
ing that Creech "by the murder or circumstances surrounding its commis-
sion, exhibited utter disregard for human life."' 0 5 After determining that
the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances,
the court sentenced Creech to death. 10 6 Creech appealed, claiming that
Idaho's "utter disregard for human life" aggravating circumstance was un-
constitutionally vague in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution.'
0 7
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed.'0 8 The court reaffirmed the lim-
iting construction it had placed on the "utter disregard for human life"
aggravating circumstance in Osborn, to refer to the "cold-blooded pitiless
slayer."10 9 The court held that this limiting construction provided a prin-
cipled definition that was sufficiently narrow and objective to withstand a
constitutional challenge. 110







101. Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 1538 (1993).
102. Id. at 1538-39.
103. Id. at 1539.
104. Id. The Court also stated that the murder, once commenced, appeared to have
been an intentional, calculated act. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(c) (1990) provides that when the court finds a statutory
aggravating circumstance, the court shall sentence the defendant to death unless the court
finds that mitigating circumstances outweigh the gravity of any aggravating circumstances
and make the imposition of death unjust.
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After the United States District Court for the District of Idaho denied
Creech's petition for writ of habeas corpus,1 11 Creech appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.112 The Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals declared Idaho's utter disregard aggravating factor
unconstitutionally vague because the limiting construction, "the cold-
blooded pitiless slayer," failed to define the statutory aggravating circum-
stance by clear and objective standards which effectively limited the sen-
tencer's discretion. 11 3 The court held that rather than requiring proof of
some fact or circumstance capable of objective determination, the limiting
construction called for a subjective determination of whether the defend-
ant was a "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer."
114
Three judges dissented. 115 The dissenters found Idaho's limiting
construction indistinguishable from the Arizona limiting construction up-
held by the Supreme Court in Walton, which called for a determination of
whether the defendant relished or evidenced a sense of pleasure in kill-
ing.1 16 These judges adhered to the Idaho state court's finding that the
limiting construction did not call for a subjective determination of
whether the defendant was a "cold-blooded pitiless slayer," but rather
called for an objective evidentiary determination based on facts and
circumstances.' 1
7
C. Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority Opinion
In the majority opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, the Court held
that the Idaho Supreme Court's limiting construction of its "utter disre-
gard for human life" aggravating circumstance to refer to the "cold-
blooded pitiless slayer" adequately channeled sentencing discretion as re-
quired by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.1 18 The Court first ad-
dressed whether the terms "cold-blooded" and "pitiless" provided clear
and objective standards that effectively cured the inherent vagueness in
the phrase "utter disregard for human life." 19 In answering this question,
the Court turned to Webster's Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary and con-
cluded that "pitiless" meant "devoid of mercy.. . or compassion" and that
111. Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1540.
112. Creech v. Arave, 947 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd in part, 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993).
113. Id. at 883-84. The court remanded to allow the state court to balance the remaining
constitutionally valid aggravating and mitigating factors before determining whether Creech
should be sentenced to death. Id. at 888. For a thorough analysis of this decision, see Troy
R. Olsen, "Utter Disregard For Human Life'--A Clear and Objective Standard for the Purpose of
Imposing the Death Penalty?, 28 IDAHo L. REv. 421 (1991-92).
114. Creech, 947 F.2d at 884.
115. Id at 888 (Trott, J., dissenting, joined by Kozinski, J., and Nelson, J.).
116. Id. at 890 (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 655 (1990)). Judge Trott stated,
"How 'objective' is 'relishing the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion'? How is
that different from evidencing an 'utter disregard for human life,' defined as intentional,
cold-blooded, and without pity... ?" Id.
117. I&




"cold-blooded" meant "matter of fact, emotionless." 120 The Court noted
that although in legal usage, "cold-blooded" is sometimes used to describe
premeditation, the Idaho court did not use the term in this sense.
121
Based on its assumption that "legislators use words in their ordinary, every-
day senses,"122 the majority concluded that in ordinary usage the phrase
"cold-blooded pitiless slayer" referred to a killer who kills without feeling
or sympathy.
123
Holding that the terms "cold-blooded" and "pitiless" describe the de-
fendant's state of mind, which is a fact to be inferred from the surround-
ing circumstance rather than a subjective matter, the Court found Idaho's
limiting construction to be sufficiently objective.' 24 The Court explained
that the language at issue was "no less 'clear and objective' than the lan-
guage sustained in Walton," which examined whether a defendant relished
or derived pleasure from his crime.
125
The second issue the majority addressed was whether Idaho's limiting
construction provided a principled basis for narrowing the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty. 126 The majority conceded that "pitiless"
standing alone might fail to adequately channel the sentencer's discretion,
because a sentencing judge could reasonably conclude that any first-de-
gree murderer kills without mercy or compassion. 127 Acknowledging that
"the question is close," the majority found that the term "cold-blooded"
provided a principled means to narrow the class of capital defendants. 128
The majority rationalized that not all killers are "cold-blooded" because
some killers exhibit feelings such as anger, jealousy, or revenge. 129 The
Court concluded that the phrase, "the cold-blooded pitiless slayer" identi-
fied a subclass of defendants who kill without feeling or sympathy and thus




Justices Blackmun and Stevens strongly dissented. They argued that
the majority's interpretation of the phrase "cold-blooded pitiless slayer"
failed to provide an adequate constitutional standard for death sentenc-
ing.13 ' The dissenters did not see how the majority's "without feeling or





124. Id. at 1541-42 (citing United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711, 716-17 (1983)).
125. Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1542.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1543.
128. Id. at 1542-43.
129. Id. at 1543.
130. Id.
131. Id at 1545 (Blackmun i., and Stevens, J, dissenting).
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... the definition of 'pitiless' that the majority concede[d] to be constitu-
tionally inadequate."
132
The dissentingJustices rejected the majority's assertion that the Idaho
construction narrows the class of capital defendants because it rules out
those who kill with anger, jealousy, or revenge. 133 The dissenters argued
that the majority's interpretation of the "cold-blooded pitiless slayer" to
refer solely to those murderers who kill without emotion or sympathy was
unsupported by ordinary usage, legal usage, and the usage of the Idaho
courts. 13 4 First, to show that the term "cold-blooded" is simply not limited
to defendants who kill without emotion or sympathy, the dissenters pro-
vided numerous examples from major newspapers that had labeled a mur-
der committed with either jealousy, revenge, hatred, or a variety of other
emotions as "cold-blooded."' 3 5
Second, the dissenting Justices explained that the only consistent
legal usage of "cold-blooded" referred to a willful, deliberate, and premed-
itated murder.' 3 6 Therefore, the term "cold-blooded" could reasonably
cover every intentional or first-degree murder and thus would fail to con-
stitutionally limit the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty.
137
Finally, after an examination of Idaho capital cases, the dissenters deter-
mined that the Idaho courts had never applied the majority's "those who
kill without feeling or sympathy" interpretation. s38 The Justices con-
cluded that instead of making a finding of "utter disregard for human life"
depend on the presence of particular facts, the Idaho sentencing scheme
allows the death penalty to be imposed based on subjective criteria.13 9
IV. ANALYsis
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Arave marks the ex-
pansion of the fundamental constitutional requirement that a state's capi-
tal sentencing scheme channel the sentencer's discretion by "clear and
objective" standards. Rather than providing a meaningful basis to distin-
guish those who deserve capital punishment from those who do not, the
majority's approval of Idaho's limiting construction results in a subjective
determination of whether a defendant is a "cold-blooded pitiless slayer"
and authorizes a sentence of death to be imposed at the complete discre-
tion of the sentencer.
4 0
Relying on its prior decision in Walton v. Arizona,' 4 1 the majority held
that the constitutionality of an aggravating factor does not depend on the
presence of objective standards, but rather on the ability of the limiting
132. Id at 1546.
133. i at 1547.
134. Id. at 1545.
135. Id. at 1547.
136. 1I
137. 1I
138. I at 1548.
139. I at 1549-50.
140. Creech, 947 F.2d at 884.
141. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
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construction to define a state of mind that is ascertainable from surround-
ing facts. 142 Justice O'Connor concluded that because the Court in Wal-
ton approved Arizona's limiting construction of its "depraved" factor as
referring to one who "relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or per-
version," Idaho's limiting construction had to be upheld because it "is no
less 'clear and objective' than the language sustained in Walton."14 This
conclusion is based on a misinterpretation and misapplication of the
Court's holding in Walton.
Contrary to the majority's assertion, the Walton decision did not estab-
lish that Arizona's construction of its "depraved" factor was sufficient to
meet constitutional standards. The Court in Walton upheld Arizona's "es-
pecially cruel, heinous or depraved" aggravating factor primarily because
the limiting construction given to the "cruelty" factor by the Arizona
Supreme Court provided an objective standard by referring to "physical
abuse" before the victim's death. 144 The Arizona Supreme Court's and
the United States Supreme Court's affirmance of Walton's sentence did
not depend on a determination that Walton's crime was especially "de-
praved." It rested rather on the conclusion that Walton committed the
murder in an "especially cruel" manner.1 45 Although the Arizona court
indicated that the murder was "especially depraved," it stated that this con-
clusion was not necessary to sustain a finding of the "especially heinous,
cruel or depraved" aggravating circumstance. 146 Justice O'Connnor ne-
glected the fact that the Court in Walton made no effort whatsoever to
justify its assertion that the Arizona Supreme Court's construction of "de-
praved" provided clear and objective standards to the sentencer. 147 In-
stead, in just one sentence, the Walton Court merely stated "nor can we
fault"14 8 the Arizona Supreme Court's construction of "depraved." 149 As
Justice Blackmun noted in Lewis v. Jeffers,150 this sentence is nothing more
than a "wholly gratuitous" scrap of dictum.
15 1
The majority's reliance on Walton also ignores the Court's prior deci-
sions in Furman,15 2 Gregg,153 Proffitt,15 4 Godfrey,155 and Cartwright.15 6 These
142. Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1541-42.
143. Id.
144. Walton, 497 U.S. at 654.
145. Lewis v.Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 792 (1990) (Blackmun,J., dissenting), rev d, 974 F.2d
1075 (9th Cir. 1992).
146. State v. Walton, 769 P.2d 1017, 1033-34 (Ariz. 1989), ajfd, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
147. Lewis, 497 U.S. at 793.
148. Walton, 497 U.S. at 655.
149. Id.
150. 497 U.S. 764 (1990). In Lewis, decided on the same day as Walton, the Court re-
jectedJeffer's claim that Arizona's "especially, cruel, heinous or depraved" aggravating factor
was unconstitutionally vague. The Court held that Walton disposed of Lewis's claim, stating,
"[W]e resolved any doubt about the matter in Walton v. Arizona... where we upheld, against
a vagueness challenge, the precise aggravating circumstance at issue in this case." Id. at 776
151. Lewis, 497 U.S. at 795.
152. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
153. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
154. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
155. 446 U.S. 420 (1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 919 (1982).
156. 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
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cases established that for a limiting construction to meet constitutional
standards, it must make reference to the suffering of the victim. Justice
O'Connor cites Proffitt to exemplify the Court's willingness to approve ag-
gravating factors that although "not susceptible of mathematical preci-
sion" are not so overbroad as to be unconstitutional. 157 The majority
neglects to note, however, that in Proffitt, the Court upheld the Florida
statute because it identified an objective standard that referred to the "un-
necessary torture" suffered by the victim, rather than solely the defend-
ant's state of mind. 158 Departing from its prior decisions, which delineate
a consistent objective standard for death sentencing, the majority readily
accepts the brief and passing dictum of Walton as authority to uphold lim-
iting constructions that make subjective reference to a defendant's state of
mind.
The dissent correctly pointed out that because the Idaho Supreme
Court failed to define "cold-blooded" and "utter disregard" with objec-
tively verifiable definitions, the construction provides no more guidance
than the statute itself.1 5 9 The only definitions given by the Idaho
Supreme Court have defined the construction to mean a killer who "acts
randomly without motive or conscience" and "does not possess the normal
restraints against committing murder"16° and a killer who acts without
"conscientious scruples against killing."16 1 What first-degree murderer
possesses the normal restraints against murder or acts with conscientious
scruples against killing? In the absence of an objectively verifiable limiting
construction, the term "cold-blooded pitiless slayer" could apply to every
first-degree murderer.162 The Idaho construction is unconstitutional be-
cause it does not make findings of aggravating factors depend on the pres-
ence of particular facts. Instead, as the State of Idaho admits, it "rel [ies] on
the ability of the sentencing judge to make principled distinctions be-
tween capital and non-capital cases with guidance that is somewhat subjec-
tive . . "163 This unbridled approach to death sentencing is precisely
forbidden under the Court's "clear and objective" standard.
Faced with an "insupportable limiting construction of an unconstitu-
tionally vague statute,"164 the majority concocted its own "constitutional"
definition of the state court's formulation by turning to the most basic of
all references-a dictionary. 165 However, the majority neglected the fact
that the Idaho courts have not limited a finding of "cold-blooded" explic-
itly to the majority's "those who kill without feeling or sympathy" interpre-
tation. Contrary to the majority's assertion that premeditation is clearly
157. Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1542 (citing Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260 (1976) (White,
J., concurring)).
158. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255.
159. Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1545 (Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. State v. Osborn, 631 P.2d 187, 214 (Idaho 1981).
161. State v. Fain, 774 P.2d 252, 269 (Idaho 1989), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2970 (1992).
162. See Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1548.
163. Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits at 11, Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534 (No. 91-
1160).
164. Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1545 (Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 1541.
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not the sense in which the Idaho Supreme Court defined "cold-blooded,"
in State v. Fetterly,166 the Idaho Supreme Court upheld a finding of "cold-
blooded" based on the fact that the crime had been planned as in much as
two or three days in advance. 167 Similarly, in the present case, the State
argued in its brief that a finding of "cold-blooded" could be proven by
"facts such as Creech's staging a pretext to kill Jensen."
168
The Idaho courts have not even limited a finding of "cold-blooded" to
those convicted of first-degree murder. In State v. Romero, 169 Judge
Bistline, in a dissent from a denial of a petition for review, characterized a
defendant as a "cold-blooded" murderer, even though the defendant had
been convicted by the trial court of manslaughter, rather than murder.
1 70
In light of the fact that the defendant killed in anger after being struck
first by the deceased, this finding directly contradicts the majority's "with-
out feeling or sympathy" interpretation of "cold-blooded."
The illusory nature of the majority's definition is further highlighted
by the present case. The trial court found that Creech did not provoke
the fight that resulted in Jensen's death but that Creech, although initially
justified in protecting himself, killed in an excessive rage.1 7' If the limit-
ing construction refers to a killer who kills without feeling or sympathy, as
the majority asserts that it does, then it was improperly applied to Creech.
Clearly, a crime committed in an excessive rage is not an emotionless
crime. Based on this evidence, it is reasonable to infer that Creech's prior
conviction for the murders of at least twenty-six people 172 may have en-
couraged the Idaho Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court
to uphold the constitutionality of Idaho's aggravating circumstance and
affirm Creech's death sentence.
The overbroad and inconsistent application of Idaho's limiting con-
struction illustrates the danger of subjective sentencing standards. Rather
than providing a clear and objective standard to channel and limit the
sentencer's discretion, the Idaho limiting construction, as applied by the
Idaho court and interpreted by the majority, is a "kitchen sink aggravating
circumstance[ ] which enable[s] the state to make every first-degree mur-
derer not just a candidate for, but an actual recipient of, the harshest and
most final of all criminal penalties."
1 73
In the future, to eliminate the arbitrariness and discrimination that
results from subjective sentencing criteria, the Court must strictly redefine
the "clear and objective" constitutional standard. The Court in prior deci-
166. 710 P.2d 1202 (Idaho 1985), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 607 (1992).
167. Id. at 1209.
168. Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits at 21, Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534 (No. 91-
1160). The record contained some evidence that other inmates may have offered to pay
Creech or help him escape if he killed Jensen. The trial court did not find that such evi-
dence established premeditation. State v. Creech, 670 P.2d 463, 465 (Idaho 1983).
169. 815 P.2d 453 (Idaho 1991).
170. Id. at 456 (Bistline, J., dissenting).
171. Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1539.
172. Id. at 1538.
173. State v. Charboneau, 774 P.2d 299, 342 (Idaho 1989) (Huntley, J., concurring and
dissenting), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 922 and 493 U.S. 923 (1989).
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sions recognized that a limiting construction that limits the application of
the death penalty to a finding of torture or serious mental or physical
abuse satisfies constitutional standards. 17 4 Rather than expand the "clear
and objective" standard based on the dicta in Walton, the Court should
adhere to its prior decisions and restrict the constitutionality of a state's
limiting construction to a finding of torture or serious mental or physical
abuse.
CONCLUSION
The majority, in declaring Idaho's limiting construction constitution-
ally valid, concedes that "the question is close."' 75 When determining
whether a person is to live or die, close is not close enough. The Court's
expansion of the "clear and objective" standard to include capital sentenc-
ing schemes that determine death sentencing based on subjective factors
will likely result in the execution of numerous inmates in Idaho and else-
where who would not otherwise be put to death. It is deeply disturbing
that instead of seizing the opportunity to proclaim that Idaho's aggravat-
ing circumstance fails to adequately guide and limit the sentencer's discre-
tion, the Court resorted to definitional quibbling to validate a
construction that allows for the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the
death penalty.
Jonah H. Goldstein
174. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
175. Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1542.
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